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Abstract Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as opposi-
tions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates
include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material
objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of
the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the
substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the
subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate
the existence of a certain kind of substance, while the other side, the relationist one,
characteristically feels that this is an unnecessary expense and that one can get the
job done in an ontologically cheaper way just with inter-related properties or events.
In this paper I shall defend the view that there is much less of a disagreement
between relational ontologies and substantival ontologies than it is usually thought.
I believe that, when carefully examined, the two sides of the debate are not that
different from each other, in all three cases of pairs of views mentioned above. As
we will see, both the relational side and the substantival side work in the same way,
suffer from and answer the same objections, and are structurally extremely similar.
It will be an important question—one that I shall discuss in detail, and that is indeed
the main point of interest for me in this paper—whether this means that the two
sides of the debate are somehow ‘equivalent’ or not, and what ‘equivalent’ could
mean.
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1 Relationist and Substantival Theories
Throughout the history of occidental philosophy, several debates have been
modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist
approach. Such debates include:
• Relationism vs. Substantivalism about time
• The Bundle Theory vs. the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects
• The Bundle (Humean) Theory vs. the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self1
In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to
provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material
objects), it is necessary to postulate the existence of a certain kind of substance2 that
is required to account for some important issues such as particularity, individuation,
unity, independence, persistence, … and that allows thus to solve some puzzle
cases, intriguing phenomena, or philosophical problems (of which I shall discuss
some examples below). Without an underlying substance, the friends of the
Substratum Theory feel that properties would go ‘floating free’ and objects like
tables would lack particularity, the Self would lack unity, and nothing could
genuinely persist through time while undergoing intrinsic change. Substantivalists
about time would analogously feel that events and things need to ‘occur at’ or ‘be
located at’ times that need to be substantial enough to be able to ‘support’ them or
‘contain’ them.
The other side, the relationist one, typically feels that this is an unnecessary
expense and that one can get the job done in an ontologically cheaper way.
Relationists will thus deny the need for any substance, they will claim that it is a
mysterious thing that we should spare ourselves, and that it is enough to use the
entities that substantivalists take to be ‘had’ or ‘united’ by the substance (properties,
events, …) and explain how these are inter-related to account for all phenomena,
puzzle cases, and philosophical problems. According to this side, that often declares
itself to be more respectful of Occam’s Razor, it is enough to have properties tied
together by a special relation of ‘compresence’ to get ordinary objects or Selves
(that are bundles of properties) and it is enough to have events related by a special
relation of simultaneity to get times (simultaneity classes of events).
Not only are the three debates similar in nature, but we also step on very similar
arguments and objections in all three cases. To mention now only one, a large
literature has been devoted to the discussion of an alleged great difficulty for bundle
theories of material objects: the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles, which
parallels the problem often raised against the relationist theory of time: the case of
‘Time without Change’. Both problems yield the same difficulty, except that in one
1 Although I talk about ‘‘the Cartesian view’’ and ‘‘the Humean view’’, I will not really be concerned
with Cartesian or Humean exegesis. I think that what I will say about these views is (at least) very close to
views Descartes and Hume actually held, but exact interpretation of their writings is a tricky endeavour
that I shall not attempt.
2 The word ‘‘substance’’ is a tricky one, and it often means very different things in the mouths of different
philosophers. I shall use it as a synonym of ‘‘substratum’’, and when it matters (see below) I will say
precisely what it refers to.
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case the question is about how to account for numerical diversity of objects that
have the same properties (that are qualitative duplicates) and in the other case the
question is about how to account for numerical diversity of times (instants) that
‘have’ the same events, that is, at which the very same events occur during a period
of time without change. (I will discuss this in detail in Sect. 2.)
In this paper I shall defend the view that there is much less of a disagreement
between relational ontologies and substantival ontologies than it is usually thought.
I believe that, when carefully examined, the two sides of the debate are not that
different from each other, in all three cases of pairs of views mentioned above. As
we will see, both the relational side and the substantival side work in the same way,
suffer from and answer the same objections, and are structurally extremely similar.
It will be an important question—one that I shall discuss in detail, and that is indeed
the main point of interest for me in this paper—whether this means that the two
sides of the debate are somehow ‘equivalent’ or not, and what ‘equivalent’ could
mean. Principally, I will ask what grounds we can have either to say that the two
sides are metaphysically equivalent and mere terminological variants of each other
or to say that they are metaphysically different views but that they are so similar that
it is epistemically under-determined which one we should choose. In the context of
the recent debate in meta-metaphysics, this choice can be seen as one between two
possible answers that have been given to the question of whether metaphysical
debates are really substantive or whether they are merely verbal. This question has
received various answers, giving rise to two ‘extreme’ and two ‘moderate’ views.
On the two opposite sides of the spectrum of the debate lie the two ‘extreme’ views:
first, the realist view recently defended by Sider (2001, 2007, 2008) defends the
claim that metaphysical disputes are substantive and that metaphysical questions
have objective answers, while the sceptical anti-realist view defended in the recent
debate in different ways by Chalmers (2008) and Yablo (2008) claims that
metaphysical questions do not have objective answers, they can be formulated and
answered in different frameworks and there is no fact of the matter as to which
framework is correct—thus, metaphysical claims lack truth-value. In between these
two ‘extreme’ views lie two ‘moderate’ ones. Bennett (2008) defends an
epistemicist view that claims that at least some metaphysical questions have
genuine objective answers but that often we cannot discover them and that
consequently there is often little reason or no reason at all to go for one side rather
than the other, and Hirsch (2005, 2007, 2008) defends a moderate anti-realist view
that claims that many metaphysical debates are merely verbal disputes where the
disputants seem to claim different things but in fact they are making the same claims
only formulated in different ways, or different languages. It is these two latter views
that I will be most interested in.
The strategy of this paper is the following. For each one of the three debates, I
shall take one central point of traditional strong disagreement between the two sides,
and I will show that, far from being a real divide, the point actually shows us how
similar the two sides are. In Benovsky (2008, and forthcoming), I was able to
examine more such points separately for these debates, but given constraints on the
length of this paper I will have to restrict myself here to one central point per debate
only. This paper in itself is thus not complete enough to draw any ‘equivalence’
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conclusion between the two sides of a debate, since this would require going
through all of the points of alleged disagreement between them; rather the focus of
this paper is to make plausible and illustrate this ‘equivalence’ claim, and discuss in
detail what drawing such a conclusion amounts to, what it means, what it depends
upon, and what its consequences are. One central point of discussion that, as we will
see, plays a vital role with respect to this meta-metaphysical question will be the
nature and the role of primitives in metaphysical theories. Primitives play a crucial
role in any theory and it is by examining one’s theory primitives and the way they
work that important steps towards an ‘equivalence’ claim can be made.
Let us start with Relationism and Substantivalism about time.
2 Relationism and Substantivalism About Time
According to the substantivalist theory of time, events and things ‘are located at’ or
‘occur at’ different instants of time and these instants are seen as being independent
of the events or things they ‘contain’. Time is then a substance composed of such
instants. It is thus easy for this view to account for periods of time without change,
that is, for periods where all change stops and the universe is ‘frozen’ during a
certain interval of time, since instants are not dependent on the changes that occur at
them. Similarly, the view is also typically taken to be able to accommodate periods
of ‘empty time’, that is, periods where no events occur at all. Metaphorically, time is
here conceived of as a container that can contain events and things, but that is
capable of not containing anything.
In opposition to substantivalism, the relationist theory of time denies the (need
for the) existence of such a substance, and claims that all there is are events and
things. Instants are not ‘containers’, rather they are constructed out of events—an
instant is a collection of simultaneous events (a simultaneity class of events). Thus,
it is typically claimed that relationism cannot accommodate the possibility of empty
time, since the very existence of instants depends on the existence of something
‘occurring at’ them, nor the possibility of time without change, which is the point I
shall now start with.
Let us imagine a Shoemaker-like universe3 where its inhabitants have very good
reasons to believe that every 30 years all change comes to a stop for 1 h. If you are
not convinced by Shoemakers’ argument, just think of it as a brute metaphysical
possibility: in this possible world, a ‘global freeze’ happens every 30 years for 1 h,
and perhaps its inhabitants never get to realize it. One can also think of this scenario
as just a useful thought experiment that helps us to articulate better the debate
between relationists and substantivalists. Typically, it has been argued that
relationism cannot accommodate such a possibility (and those who find this
possibility genuinely plausible consequently take it to be an argument against this
view). At least prima facie, this seems like the right thing to say: if there are no
changes, if the universe is ‘frozen’, it appears that under relationism there is no way
3 See Shoemaker (1969).
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of having different instants that would constitute a 1 h long series, since these
instants would all turn out to be one and the very same instant.
In what follows I intend to show that far from not being able to accommodate the
possibility of global freezes, relationism can actually accommodate it in the same
way substantivalism does. But my point here is not to defend relationism, rather I
am interested in defending the view that the two sides of this debate about the nature
of time are extremely similar to one each other. My strategy is thus very different
from, for instance, Forbes’ (1993) strategy that ‘modalizes’ relationism, that is,
includes other-worldly events into the making of this-worldly instants, in order to be
able to distinguish instants modally during periods of global freezes. Such a strategy
is one that wants to defend relationism by repairing it and improving it, whereas I
want to claim that relationism as it stands can face the case of time without change
in exactly the same way substantivalism does.
Let us first ask: how exactly does substantivalism accommodate the possibility of
global freezes? If there is a global freeze and all change stops, how can time
continue to flow? What we need here is to be able to accommodate the possibility of
a series of non-identical instants, instead of just one instant. But how can instants
that compose a series during a global freeze be distinguished? They cannot be
distinguished by the events/changes that occur at them, since there are no changes
and the events are all the same at all instants during this series. Qualitatively
speaking, all of them are indiscernible, and so if qualitative identity were the
relevant criterion for distinguishing instants, there would only be one instant instead
of a 1 h long series. So what makes different instants different is something else
than qualitative differences: instants are primitively numerically distinct entities that
do not require to be distinguished qualitatively (since, in the first place, they do not
have a qualitative nature such that they could be distinguished in a qualitative way).
Metaphorically speaking, instants are containers that are in themselves qualitatively
indistinguishable and that, during a global freeze, contain qualitatively indistin-
guishable stuff, but that are primitively numerically distinct.
Instants conceived of in such a way are what I will call ‘‘problem-solvers’’. In
short, a problem-solver is a primitive of a theory that allows us to solve a problem.
In general, it is probably the case that all primitives are, at least to some extent,
problem-solvers, for primitives are typically introduced in any theory to do an
explanatory job that they manage to do by having the primitive capacity to do so. In
the case of substantivalism, how can the theory account for the possibility of periods
of time without change? By using its primitive notion of instants that are
qualitatively indistinguishable but that are primitively numerically distinct. This
premise is thus a ‘‘problem-solver’’ since without appealing to it the theory would
not be able to accommodate the possibility of global freezes and since it succeeds to
achieve its end only in virtue of the postulation that it can do so. It may seem from
what I just said that I take substantivalism to be an unappealing view that does not
know better than primitively postulating solutions to its theoretical challenges. But
this is not so: every theory has its primitives (we will see more examples below),
and every theory has the right to do so, since without the use of such problem-
solvers we would not be able to get very far in the construction of metaphysical
theories (the examples below will also make this clear).
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Now, what about relationism? Since under relationism instants are simultaneity
classes of events, that is, they are bundles4 of events tied together by a relation of
simultaneity, they are individuated by these events and the relation—consequently,
instants have a qualitative nature and they can be distinguished by the events they
contain. But not in the case of a global freeze: when such a period of time without
change occurs, all instants that form the 1 h long series contain the very same events
and so cannot be qualitatively distinguished, and so where we wanted to have a
series of distinct instants we turn out to have only one instant—this is why the
objector argues that relationism is unable to account for the possibility of time
without change.
But let us look more closely at how relationism works; especially, let us examine
what the relation of simultaneity is and what it does. The theoretical role of this
relation is the functional role to take events as input and provide instants as output.
Each instant has its own such relation, it cannot be one and the very same relation
for all instants, since otherwise, global freeze or not, there would ever only be one
‘big’ instant containing all (past, present, future) events that would be simultaneous
with one each other (alternatively this job can be done by different instances of the
same relation5). This is then a schema of the structure of relationism:
E1, E2, E3
Instant1
Time 
S 
E4, E5, E6
Instant2
S' 
……….. 
Instant3
S'' 
4 Not sets, since instants are not abstract entities according to this view.
5 If properties and relations are tropes, the situation is obvious: tropes being non-repeatable entities it
would not even be possible for the relation of simultaneity to be one and the same for different instants, so
what we have here are exactly resembling and numerically distinct tropes of simultaneity, one per instant.
If properties and relations are universals, there are two possibilities: either the relation of simultaneity is
one and the very same relation for all instants, or it is a different universal for each instant. As suggested,
the former possibility yields difficulties even if no global freeze occurs—the case of a global freeze is just
the most salient case where these difficulties become the most apparent—so it is the latter that should be
endorsed anyway. Alternatively, claiming that there are numerically different instances of one universal
of simultaneity could also do the job. Such moves are similar to a strategy that Paul (forthcoming)
explores with respect to the Bundle Theory of objects, when she says: ‘‘[…] properties are shared, while
property instances are primitively individuated. On this approach the explanation of the possibility of the
qualitative indiscernibility of the spheres in W is based on an underlying identity of properties, while
the numerical difference between the spheres reductively supervenes upon the numerical difference of the
property instances in each bundle’’. What is important for me here is that there is always something
numerically different for each instant that is responsible for tying up together the events to make up the
instant.
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Time is a series of instants that are made out of events tied together by a relation
of simultaneity, a different one for all instants. Now, when a global freeze occurs,
there are no changes, and so the events that compose the instants are the same, but
there is nothing there that prevents relationism from accommodating the claim that
there is a 1 h series of numerically distinct instants: granted, this series is formed by
instants that cannot be distinguished by the events they contain, but they can be
distinguished by the relation of simultaneity that is a different one in two different
instants (even when no freeze is going on). The relation of simultaneity individuates
instants as well as events do, and instants can thus be numerically distinguished
because they contain numerically distinct relations of simultaneity, even if they
cannot be qualitatively distinguished (that is, distinguished by appeal to the events
the contain). One may ask: but how is one relation of simultaneity distinguished
from another relation of simultaneity? (I mean how, not why, we have seen why
above.) How is it not the case that since presumably one relation of simultaneity is
qualitatively indistinguishable from another, it just turns out, contrary to what we
would want here, to be one and the very same relation for all instants? Exactly as in
the case of substantivalism, the answer is: the different relations of simultaneity can
be said to be primitively numerically distinct. So, as before, relationism contains
here a problem-solver that parallels the one that is appealed to by substantivalists: it
is only by appealing to their primitive problem-solving machinery that distinguishes
primitively numerically different instants that both relationism and substantivalism
can accommodate the theoretical challenge of the possibility of time without
change. Both problem-solvers have the same function with respect to the problem
concerning time without change, and consequently they are theoretically equivalent.
The fact that one side of the debate calls its problem-solver a ‘‘substance’’ or a
‘‘container’’ or a ‘‘time’’, while the other side calls its problem-solver a ‘‘relation of
simultaneity’’, does not change the fact that when one looks closely at what these
primitive problem-solvers are doing in the theory, they do turn out to be
(theoretically, functionally) indistinguishable: they both have the function to make
different instants different. But before I go any further and before I discuss in detail
what the consequences of this are (in Sect. 4), let us turn our attention to an
analogous debate that exhibits a relational and a substantival side, namely, the
Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about material objects and about the
Self.
3 The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory
While the substratum theory postulates two kinds of components to make up
material objects like, say, a table or a person, the bundle theory postulates only one.
Sometimes the substratum theory is also called the ‘‘substance-attribute view’’ to
make this apparent: there is a substance (or ‘‘substratum’’, or ‘‘underlying subject’’,
or ‘‘bare particular’’) and there are properties (attributes) that are had by this
substance. (I shall use ‘‘substratum’’ rather than ‘‘substance’’, the latter being a
tricky word in philosophy meaning very different things in the mouths of different
philosophers.) Traditionally opposed to this, the bundle theory wants itself to be
Relational and Substantival Ontologies 107
123
more economical and uses one kind of component only: the same properties that the
friends of substrata take to be had by the substratum, but ‘only’ tied together by a
special n-adic property often called ‘‘compresence’’. Reality is thus constituted
fundamentally only by properties, and objects like tables or persons are ‘just’
bundles of those.
I take it that the overall structural similarities between substantivalism and the
substratum theory, and between relationism and the bundle theory, are quite
obvious. The former two theories do their job by having some sort of primitive
substance that somehow supports what is in need of being supported (events in one
case, properties in the other); the latter two views both reject this conception and
claim that events or properties need not be supported or had by anything and that the
notion of a primitive supporting substance can be very well eliminated and replaced
by collections of these ‘unsupported’ entities (that is, by a primitive relation of
‘compresence’ or ‘simultaneity’).
Depending on how one conceives of the compresence relation (the ‘bundling’
relation) and of the nature of properties, the bundle theory comes in different
versions. Most relevantly, both the bundle theory and the substratum theory come in
a version where properties are tropes (and in this case the compresence relation has
to be a numerically distinct relation in every particular object, since a trope is a non-
repeatable entity) and in a version where properties are universals (and in this case
there are both the possibilities that the relation of compresence is a different one for
every object, or that it is one and the same variably polyadic relation for all objects).
In what follows, I shall remain neutral with respect to any preference of tropes or
universals.
The bundling relation used by the bundle theory goes around under different
names like ‘‘compresence’’, ‘‘consubstantiation’’, ‘‘co-instantiation’’, ‘‘together-
ness’’, ‘‘collocation’’, ‘‘co-personality’’ (in the special case of the Humean bundle
theory of the Self)—but all these different names do not hide different conceptions
or different analysis or what this bundling relation is; rather, most typically, all
bundle theorists take it as being a primitive. Thus, analogously to what we have seen
above in the case of relationism and substantivalism, what is important is not so
much (or even not at all, as we shall see below) how this relation is called or what it
is, but rather what it does: it is a unifying device, that is, a primitive bit of theory that
has the function within the theory to take properties to make up objects. Putting it as
an objection to the bundle theory, Peter Simons (1994, p. 371) expresses this quite
clearly when he says that ‘‘[…] all we are saying is that a bundle of tropes is held
together by whatever relation holds it together. This is really giving up.’’ Forget now
about the ‘‘giving up’’ part of Simons’ claim, and concentrate on the nature of the
bundling relation: it is, to paraphrase Locke, a ‘‘we-know-not-what’’ but … it is a
‘‘we-do-know-what-it-does’’ ! We know its theoretical role: what it does is that it
ties together properties to make up objects, and that’s all we need to be told, the
bundling relation being a primitive device introduced by the bundle theorist
precisely for this purpose.
In the case of the substratum theory, things are exactly the same way, and it is
even more obvious: the substratum also goes around under different names like
‘‘naked particular’’, ‘‘bare particular’’, ‘‘thin particular’’, or ‘‘substance’’ but we are
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typically not told anything in place of an analysis or explanation of the nature of the
substratum, it is also a primitive whose theoretical role is to support properties of an
object. Its theoretical function is, as in the case of the bundling relation, to take
properties to make up objects—that’s what it does, that’s its main job. As before, it
is a ‘‘we-know-not-what’’ in the sense that it is ontologically primitive and
unanalyzable, but it is a ‘‘we-do-know-what-it-does’’. As in the case of the bundling
relation, the substratum is thus individuated by its theoretical role: it is a unifying
device. Both the bundle theory and the substratum theory thus have a unifying
device, a primitive and under-defined one, an entity whose purpose is to tie or glue
together properties of a single object.
With respect to the issue about particularity and unity of objects, both the bundle
theory and the substratum theory thus contain a problem-solver in the same sense in
which relationism and substantivalism contain one. Another way to see this is to ask
how the theory accounts for numerical diversity of different substrata—it cannot be
done qualitatively since substrata in themselves do not have any qualities, and so,
here again, the question is answered by a primitivist claim … exactly as in the case
of the bundle theory’s bundling relation where one can also ask what makes one
such unifying device bundling together properties of an object A numerically
distinct from another unifying device bundling together properties of an object B.
These primitivist strategies that appeal to problem-solvers that are now familiar to
us from the discussion about relationism and substantivalism thus play a crucial role
in both the substratum theory and the bundle theory with respect to the central
question that both theories address, namely the question of what an object is and
what makes it a particular.
One could think that the status of the bundle theory’s unifying device is
importantly different from the status of the substratum theory’s unifying device
because the former is just one among the elements of a bundle (it is a property, after
all) while the latter is to be considered apart from the properties it bears—thus even
if both are primitive problem-solving unifying devices, they do not play their
primitive theoretical role in the same way. But, as Ehring (2001) shows, this would
be misconceiving the status of the bundling relation (what follows is an almost exact
quote from Ehring that I just adapted to suit my needs): The properties included in a
bundle are compresent. The compresence relation, however, is not a member of the
bundle like the other properties and relations because if we included compresence in
the bundle, then it would itself have to be compresent with the other properties:
compresence compresent with F, G, H, … But that either makes no sense or leads to
an infinite regress. And what it shows is that compresence, exactly as the
substratum, has to be considered apart from the other properties of the object,
because it is a higher-order relation that has properties as relata that does not have
the same theoretical role as any other properties—its status as a unifying device is
different from the other properties and is the same in the bundle theory and the
substratum theory.
We have now seen that the bundle theory and the substratum theory both contain
a primitive problem-solver that functions in the same way with respect to the
problem of unity and particularity of particulars. Let us now see that it also plays the
same theoretical role in the same way with respect to another central problem:
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the persistence of ordinary objects through time and qualitative change. Elsewhere6
I have examined this in more detail, articulating both a perdurantist and endurantist
versions of both views; here I will only limit myself to convey the main idea about
how these problem-solvers do their job.
When an object undergoes qualitative change, that is, change in its properties,
there still is some sense in which we want to be able to say that it’s the same object
even if it isn’t qualitatively the same. Typically, it is argued that the substratum
theory has no problem with such a claim—take the case of my neighbour Cyrano: he
first has a big nose, then he undergoes plastic surgery, and so later on he has a small
nose, but he still is one and the same object since even if his properties change
(some properties are replaced by others) something always remains: the substratum.
The bundle theory is traditionally unable to do anything like this: ‘‘If a thing were a
set of properties, it would be incapable of change. For a thing could change its
properties only if the set identical with it could change its members, but that is
impossible; no set can change its members. […] What we have is replacement of
one individual by another, not change in the properties of one and the same
individual.’’ (Van Cleve 1985, p. 122–124).
But let us look more carefully at what is going on here. First, let us ask: how does
the substratum theory do it to answer this objection, or more precisely how is it so
that the objection allegedly does not even arise against the substratum theory? What
exactly happens when Cyrano changes from being big-nosed to being small-nosed?
If Cyrano is a ‘thick particular’, that is, a substratum ? its properties, then he does
not change for exactly the same reason Van Cleve claims that there is no change
under the bundle theory: the thick particular with a big nose is simply replaced by
something different, another thick particular with a small nose—and these two
entities just are two different things, exactly as two different bundles are two
different things if they do not contain the same properties. Then maybe Cyrano is
the ‘thin particular’, that is, he only is the substratum—but in this case he cannot
undergo qualitative change either since the substratum in itself does not have any
qualities that could change, so no change is possible here either. So it seems that,
contrary to appearances, both views suffer from the same objection for mostly the
same reason: instead of genuine change we seem to have replacement (or no change
at all). Now, the similarity between the two views does not stop here, since it is also
the case that both views can answer this objection in a parallel way. Again, the
details of this, featuring perdurantism and endurantism, I discussed elsewhere, but
the core idea can be quickly put as follows: friends of the substratum theory will
claim that when Cyrano undergoes qualitative change there is an object that is made
up of a substratum and of properties, the properties are replaced, but something
remains the same over time, the substratum, and this is what gives justice to the
claim that Cyrano is one and the same object through time and through change since
the substratum is the crucial element that makes him to be what he is—it is what
makes him to be this particular and not some other particular. But then, if something
along these lines is an acceptable account of qualitative change, the bundle theory
has exactly the same strategy at hand (see how easy it is for me to write an almost
6 Benovsky (2008).
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exact sentence here): when Cyrano undergoes qualitative change there is an object
that is made up of properties tied together by a bundling relation, the properties are
replaced, but something remains the same over time, the bundling relation, and this
is what gives justice to the claim that Cyrano is one and the same object through
time and through change since the bundling relation is the crucial element that
makes him to be what he is—it is what makes him to be this particular and not some
other particular. Both views can thus appeal to their ‘particularizing’ primitive
problem-solving unifying device to face the challenge arising from cases of
qualitative change, and both can do it in the same way.
Now, the meta-metaphysician raises her eyebrows: what difference does it really
make to use the unifying device ‘‘substratum’’ or the unifying device ‘‘compres-
ence’’? This question also applies to relationism and substantivalism: what
difference does it really make to use the problem-solver ‘‘relation of simultaneity’’
or the problem-solver ‘‘substance/instant’’? Before answering this question, let us
quickly examine a last illustrative case in a more precise way: the case of the bundle
theory and the substratum theory of the Self with respect to the problem of fission
and change over time. Indeed, until now I have shortly discussed a normal case of
persistence of objects through time involving simple change in intrinsic properties.
Interestingly, Shoemaker (1997) discusses a fictional case of fission (and also of
teletransportation) of persons and suggests that friends of the substratum view of the
Self have the natural tendency to regard these cases as not person-preserving, while
friends of the bundle view of the Self typically find it natural to say that they are. If
so, it could mean that there is some difference with respect to persistence through
time of Selves that only becomes apparent in these extravagant cases.
But I think that there is no reason why one side should find it more natural than the
other to claim that such procedures are person-preserving or not—rather, such a claim
is independent of the choice between a substantival approach or a bundle-theoretic
approach; it is for independent reasons that one might think (or not) that the procedure
is not person-preserving and then model the situation either in terms of substrata or in
terms of bundles, with no significant difference. To illustrate this, let us examine what
might happen in a fictional case of fission of my neighbour Cyrano who has a big nose
and who wants to undergo plastic surgery in order to have a smaller one. Unfortunately
for him, just before the surgery, he undergoes fission, and since he only has money to
pay the surgery once, only one of the two post-fission Cyrano(s) will be able to get a
smaller nose, while the other will have to keep the big one. With respect to the identity
of Cyrano, there are four possibilities: both of the resulting post-fission Selves are
Cyrano(s), none of the two resulting Selves is Cyrano, or one of the two is Cyrano and
the other is not. All four possibilities can be equally well modeled and accounted for by
the substratum view and the bundle view; let us quickly see how this looks for the first
option, the other three cases being easily done in a similar way. Since this case also
involves simple change in intrinsic properties over time, it is also needed to be here
more precise about which theory of persistence one is using—I shall use here the
perdurantist ‘worm view’ that seems to me the most easily pictorially illustrative of the
non-differences between the bundle theory and the substratum theory. If both post-
fission Selves are said to be Cyrano(s), this is how it looks under perdurantism and the
bundle view:
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According to the perdurantist worm view, the case of fission is no more than a
case of sharing an overlapping temporal part. The bundle view can easily provide
such an account as pictured above where ‘‘C’’ stands for ‘‘compresence’’ and the
substratum view can do the same—just replace the Cs with Ss ! Instead of appealing
to the unifying device ‘‘compresence’’, one can use the unifying device ‘‘substra-
tum’’ to unify Cyrano’s temporal part’s properties. There is no reason why one
could not do this as simply as that—and the simpler this is to do, the more it points
towards the idea that it just does not matter which way we put it. Under both views,
it is easy to model the idea that a fission case is person-preserving and that both
post-fission resulting persons are Cyrano(s), and it would be equally easy, using the
same strategy, to model the other three options, under both the perdurantist and the
endurantist approach. So, the question whether fission or teletransportation
procedures are person-preserving must be decided on other grounds (most likely,
the answer will depend on the nature of the relation that ‘glues together’ temporal
parts of worms like Cyrano under perdurantism, and on the criteria for diachronic
identity under endurantism), and then modeled in one or the other way, using with
equal efficiency substrata or bundles.
The upshot of all the above considerations is, again, the following: the underlying
substratum and the compresence relation (usually called the ‘‘co-personality
relation’’ in the case of Selves) play the same theoretical role. Thus, because both
the relationist side and the substantivalist side use their unifying device in the same
way, they have exactly the same means to face the case of intrinsic change over time
and the case of fission in a parallel way.
All the cases we have seen are illustrative of a phenomenon that affects relational
and substantival ontologies in general: objections traditionally raised against one
side actually have a sneaky tendency to arise for the other side as well, and can be
answered (or cannot be answered) in the same way by both parties. Relevantly, in all
such cases, the job is done by appeal to the theory’s primitives. But if these are
theoretical entities individuated by their theoretical role, and if this role is the same,
then it becomes really hard to see what difference there is between the two sides of
the debate. This claim rests upon the idea that primitives are individuated by their
functional role rather than by their nature, which is an important point to which I
shall turn now.
F   Big 
t1-part 
C 
t2-part
C' 
t2-part
C'' 
F     Big 
F   Small 
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4 On Primitives and Equivalences
The view that underlies my way of seeing all the illustrative cases above is a
view about the nature of primitives in metaphysics such as the problem-solvers
we have seen that takes very seriously the functional role they play in the
theory. By its very nature, a primitive being primitive, it is non-analysable and
we are not really given any information concerning its nature; we are told what
it does rather than what it is. So it is what it does that counts—after all, that’s
what any primitive is introduced for in a theory in the first place (otherwise
there would be little justification for having it). Thus, primitives are individuated
by what they do, what their functional role in a theory is, and as a consequence
two primitives that do the same job just turn out to be equivalent for all
theoretical purposes and metaphysically equivalent as well: they just are one and
the same thing referred to in two different ways. We have seen above that with
respect to some traditional alleged points of disagreement, the views I have
examined contain a primitive machinery that does the same job at the same
place in the same way (that is, in a primitive way).
This is what I will call the ‘‘functional view’’ of primitives, it’s the view that I
have been using above and that I believe to be correct. But there is an alternative
view, that I will call the ‘‘content view’’ of primitives, that claims that not only do
primitives have a function in a theory but they also have a nature (a content). For
instance, in the case of the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory this view
insists that the unifying device involved in the former is a relation while the
unifying device involved in the latter is a substratum and this just is not the same
thing, however, similarly they may work.
Choosing between the functional view or the content view has important
consequences for the sort of conclusions that can be drawn about the three pairs of
relational and substantival theories. If the functional view is correct, the primitives
used by the two sides of a debate just turn out to be the same thing and given the
similarity of structure and equivalent explanatory power of the two allegedly
competing theories, it appears that the difference between the relational side and the
substantival side is no more than terminological. I leave it then an open question
whether this terminological difference can be a good reason to prefer one side over
the other. Hirsch (2005, 2007, 2008), when making an equivalence claim about the
debate between perdurantists and endurantists, insists that while there is only
terminological difference between the two sides of the debate, the endurantist
language is closer to ordinary language and so should be preferred. Alternatively,
one can see closeness of theoretical terminology to ordinary language as irrelevant
and simply claim that it does not matter at all which side of the debate one chooses
to embrace—or better, that we should simply refrain from choosing. This question
about which is the better terminology left aside, I would like to insist on the
following: in all theories we have seen, and in metaphysical theories in general (we
will see shortly some other examples below), the primitives do a big part of the
job—indeed, without its primitives none of the views would even begin to work and
primitives are used in all crucial places where a serious problem needs to be solved
or an important phenomenon (like persistence, unity, …) accounted for. Under the
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functional view, it is then no wonder that if the primitives turn out to be equivalent
(since they are individuated by their theoretical role and the role is equivalent) then
the theories that contain them appear to be no more than terminological variants.
I will call this the ‘‘Strong Conclusion’’.
The content view of primitives allows for a Weak(er) Conclusion to hold. Indeed,
even if it is accepted that the problem-solving primitives used by two sides of a
debate are functionally equivalent, they still are, according to this view, different in
nature and so the theories that contain them cannot in turn be said to be equivalent—
that is, they cannot be said to be metaphysically equivalent, while of course they can
be said to be theoretically equivalent given that they do the very same job in the
same way. The Weak Conclusion then claims not that the two sides of the debate are
merely terminological variants, since they postulate primitives that are metaphys-
ically different, but that it is epistemically under-determined which one we should
choose.
Let me now say why I think that the functional view is to be preferred. Take the
case of the Bundle Theory and Substratum Theory: the defender of the content
view will insist that one side’s problem-solver is a relation and the other side’s
problem-solver is a substratum and so they are entities with a different nature.
Now, I think there are two possibilities: either any difference that this can make
will be a functional difference, or this is just stubbornly sticking to terminology.
For instance, the defender of the content view might say that a substratum is
‘ontologically independent’, that is, it can exist without exemplifying any
properties, while the relation of compresence cannot just ‘be there’ and relate
nothing. But if that were to be a way to claim that there is a difference between the
two primitives, then it would be a functional difference: there is something that
one primitive can do (standing alone, not unifying anything) and that the other
primitive cannot do. So this is not going to give the friend of the content view
what she needs. But it could, of course, block any equivalence claim since this
would actually show that the two unifying devices do not always play the same
theoretical role in the same way, and are thus not equivalent—or at least the
equivalence claim has to be restricted to some cases only, but cannot be
generalized. This is of course something that I am open to: if it can be shown that
the two unifying devices do not have exactly the same function, any of the (Weak
or Strong) Conclusions could only be partial. Elsewhere7 I have discussed the case
I just mentioned about ‘independence’ with the result that there actually is no
difference with respect to the two primitives, but in principle it is an open
possibility that a place where they do play a different role can be found (but until
then, the equivalence claim holds). Anyway, even if this were the case, the
difference between the two primitives would be a functional difference so such a
case would count in favour of the functional view. In principle, we should always
expect any difference between primitives to be functional, with no surprise: since
primitives are introduced in the theory by the metaphysician who needs them
because she cannot make the theory work without them, she’ll typically always
introduce primitives to do a theoretical job, otherwise she would not even bother
7 Benovsky (forthcoming, Sect. 4).
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with them in the first place—this is why it seems to me quite obvious that any
difference we could find between primitives will turn out to be functional.8 If
someone insisted that on the top of the functions they play in the theory, primitives
have a non-functional content, this would then amount to insisting that she
postulates a difference that makes no difference—and I can only say that I see
little reason for doing anything like that when building a metaphysical theory.
Such an attitude towards primitives would be having an unreasonable soft spot for
the words one uses—words like ‘‘substance’’, ‘‘substratum’’, ‘‘relation’’, and so on.
Perhaps the friend of the content view could argue that even if two primitives
play the same theoretical role—that is, they have the same function—they still
have a different nature and a non-functional way to see that is to embrace one of
the two primitives as being more intuitive than the other. Something like this
might have played an important role in the debate between substratum theorists
and bundle theorists where the latter sometimes in this vein qualified the
substratum as being a mysterious entity. So can intuitions help us to distinguish
between two primitives that have the same function? I do not think so: there are
some worries that arise here, showing that intuitions are not really pertinent in this
matter. Firstly, intuitions do not seem to be relevant in the field of basic
metaphysics that is just too abstract and theoretical for any useful intuitions to
arise—unlike in other less basic debates; for instance, imaginary cases or Star
Trek stories of duplication of persons in the debate about personal identity allow
us to give rise to some carefully formulated and useful intuitions that can probably
do some helpful work in the understating of our concept of a person and its
conditions of persistence through time. But when fundamental and highly abstract
metaphysical issues are concerned, such as those that we are concerned with in
our case of the three pairs of relational and substantival ontologies, there just do
not seem to be any useful intuitions around: these are not matters where anybody
can have any intuitions, except, again, misleading intuitions that come from
attachment to words like ‘‘substance’’ or ‘‘relation’’. Secondly, any intuitions
suffer from being too unsettled and variable from one thinker to another and even
over time for one and the same thinker, and even there conflicting intuitions, good
and bad intuitions, as well as weak and strong intuitions can arise—thus, they do
not seem to be a very reliable guide.
I think that this leaves us with the functional view, and with the consequence that
if my arguments from Sects. 1 to 3 are correct, a Strong Conclusion can be drawn
8 This is also the reason why I prefer to restrict my claim that the functional view is correct only to the
case of primitives, and not all other cases of functionally equivalent non-primitive entities or bits of
theories. For instance, you might think of the case of two properties that have each a certain function in a
world W and that ’switch’ their function in a world W0 while each keeping its identity: in such a case, it
seems that something like the content view is to be preferred, with respect to the nature of properties. The
difference between such cases and the case of primitives is that primitives are theoretical postulates that
are introduced in a theory by a metaphysician who needs them to perform a certain job, a function, and so
this is why I think there that the functional view holds, while properties are not just theoretical postulates
and so it may very well be that with respect to properties the content view is more adequate since it seems
at least prima facie more plausible that they have a nature that is not reducible only to their function. (But
of course, the opposite may turn out to be true; all I want to say is that I wish here to restrict my claims
only to the case of primitives.).
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about the three pairs of relational and substantival ontologies.9 (If you are not
convinced by the functional view of primitives, then it is the Weak Conclusion that
is in order—a Weak Conclusion that is still pretty strong.) To sum up some central
points of my approach:
• theories such as the 6 theories discussed in this paper only work thanks to the job
done by their primitives; this is of course to be expected and perfectly in order
since otherwise there would be no reason to introduce the primitives in the first
place
• thus, it is crucial to recognize that, indeed, these primitives are introduced by the
theorist, they are theoretical postulates that are introduced to do a job: they are
there for what they can do, they are functions within the theory
• as such, they are individuated by their functional role; this has the consequence
that if two primitives have the same function they turn out to be not only
theoretically but also metaphysically equivalent
• I have provided some examples as study cases of places where I think that
allegedly competing theories exhibit such equivalent primitives and since these
theories are also structurally extremely similar and since most of the work they
do is done by their primitives, the Strong Conclusion, that is, a conclusion of
metaphysical equivalence, can be drawn
I shall now conclude by examining two objections that can be made to my
approach, both of which will allow me to refine the scope and the content of my
conclusions. Put shortly, a first worry could be that I have considered here too
substantival versions of the relational ontologies I used as examples. To take the
case of relationism about time, one way to articulate this worry would be to claim
that there may be, and there are, versions of relationism that do not appeal to a
metaphysically loaded relation of simultaneity to get instants out of events, and that
doing so is somehow for a relationist to betray the spirit of her own view, by
mimicking her opponent’s. The reason and the need for her to do so may then
simply have come from the pressure of objections to relationism like the Shoemaker
one—involved in a debate filled with considerations about global freezes and empty
time, the relationist (at least the relationist I considered in this paper) then subtly has
the tendency to adopt a substantival ideology and tools, disguised under relationist
vocabulary. To my mind, if anything like this were true, it would be an interesting
result in itself.
As a more general worry, one could also ask10 whether the method I recommend
to use in order to see whether two theories are equivalent or not—that is, to look at
how the theories and primitives work, how they function, to see whether any
equivalence claim can be drawn—does not give us equivalence too easily and too
cheaply. Indeed, in a very general way one could use my claims to say that
9 With the important proviso that I have here only partly and not fully examined the three debates, so any
conclusion that can be drawn here is only partial. I have examined the three debates in more detail and
with more completeness elsewhere (see Benovsky 2008); but most of all I hope that I have made plausible
here the method to achieve the conclusion, that can be applied to other points of alleged disagreement
between the two sides in the same way.
10 I would like to thank Mark Heller for insisting on this.
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whenever two theories explain the same thing, they turn out to be equivalent. The
materialist and the dualist both account, in their own terms, for the fact that I feel
back pain this morning and for the having of qualia in general—does it then mean
that I would say that they are equivalent, since they accomplish the same work in
the end? Of course, this is not something that I want to say. Elsewhere,11 contra
Hirsch (2008) and Miller (2005), I have for instance argued that following my
method perdurantism and endurantism are not equivalent, they are only partly
equivalent but there remain genuine substantial differences between these two sides
of the persistence debate. Examining this debate here would be too long, so let me
take another example that will allow me to say what is too cheap and what is not.
Let us take three theories about the nature of ordinary material objects and see how
they behave with respect to the traditional problem of ‘‘attribute agreement’’. The
central questions these theories face are: (1) What are material objects (such as
tables, computers, lizards, …), what is their nature? (2) What are properties, what is
their nature? (3) How do objects have their properties? It is better to consider views
that answer all three questions, since if we took only one question at a time, we
would never have theories ‘complete enough’ to be proper subjects of comparison
and evaluation. A complete cartography of the various theories that provide answers
to these questions would be a matter for a very long book, and would fall quite
outside the scope and the purpose of this paper; but it is enough for my present
concerns to use as an example a partial and quite schematic map, featuring what I
take to be the three strongest, most representative, and typical views.12
Theory 1 Substrata that instantiate immanent universals
Answer to Question 1 Objects are bare particulars (substrata) that instantiate immanent
(spatio-temporal, multiply locatable) universals
Answer to Questions 2 and 3 a is F iff a instantiates the universal F-ness
a and b are both F (‘share the same property’) iff a and b both
instantiate the numerically same universal F-ness
Primitives, and other
ontological commitments
Bare particulars (substrata)
Immanent universals
Non-relational instantiation
Main objections (and replies) OBJ1: Infinite (Bradley-like) Regress, [REPLY: the primitive
instantiation is non-relational (Armstrong 1978)]
OBJ 2: Immanent universals are unacceptable because multiple
location is absurd: ‘‘redness is at one meter from itself’’, [REPLY:
this intuition was made for objects, not for properties (Lewis 1983;
Loux 1998; Hawthorne and Cover 1998)]
11 Benovsky (2009).
12 If your preferred view is not listed here, just add it yourself; I am sure that you will get a table similar
to the ones I have here. The references provided in these tables are not (always) references to the original
places where the objection or point first appeared, rather they are references to places where it is, in my
opinion, nicely articulated.
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Theory 1 continued
OBJ 3: Identity conditions of substrata. In virtue of what is a substratum distinct from another? No
attributes or properties can distinguish between them. Loux (1998), [REPLY: They do have
properties. For what it is to have properties, according to the substratum theory, is to instantiate
universals (Sider 2006)]
OBJ 4: Substrata are unknowable and they cannot be experienced. Campbell (1981), [REPLY 1: let
us concede that the introduction of bare substrata is incompatible with a rigorous empiricism, but
[…] the constraints the empiricist imposes on the metaphysical enterprise are unreasonably
stringent. Loux (1997, 1998), REPLY 2: Substrata do have properties, so the epistemological
argument may be swiftly dispatched. We clearly can know what universals a thin particular
instantiates, and so know what it is like; and in what other sense ought we be able to ‘‘know it’’?
(Sider 2006)]
OBJ 5: The idea of a bare entity with no essential attributes is incoherent, substrata have the property
of not having any property (Loux 1997, 1998), [REPLY: only sparse properties count here, and
‘having no property’ is not sparse (Armstrong 1978; Sider 2006)]
Theory 2 Bundles of tropes
Answer to Question 1 Objects are bundles of compresent non-repeatable properties (tropes)
Answer to Questions 2 and 3 a is F iff a has among its members/constituents/parts an F-trope
a and b are both F (‘share the same property’) iff a and b both have
among their members/constituents/parts numerically different F-
tropes that are exactly similar
Primitives, and other
ontological commitments
Tropes (their existence and nature)
Compresence
Exact resemblance of tropes; resemblance
Possibilia ? counterpart theory
Main objections (and replies) OBJ1: variant of the problem with co-extensive properties (Manley
2002), (REPLY: use possibilia)
OBJ2: if F-ness is the set of all resembling tropes, since sets have their
members necessarily, there could not be a single object that is F in
addition to those that are there (Loux 1998), (REPLY: use possibilia)
OBJ3: the problem of naturalness (imperfect community difficulty),
[REPLY: does not arise if we use exact resemblance (a primitive);
more in Manley (2002)]
OBJ 4: Infinite Regress—if we have exactly resembling tropes then
the resemblance relations must resemble, and these must resemble,
and so on. [REPLY: there is no regress thanks to the primitive fact
that a and b resemble each other. We do not have two tropes and a
relation of resemblance, but two tropes, and given these two, they
resemble (Simons 1994)]
OBJ 5: Problem with change. If an individual is identified with a
bundle of properties, then if one of the properties changes, the bundle
is not the same, and so, the individual who is the bundle is not the
same. (Van Cleve 1985), [REPLY: use four-dimensionalism
(Hawthorne and Cover 1998), or also endurantism (Benovsky 2008)]
OBJ 6: Modal analogue of the problem of change above. (REPLY: use
modal counterpart theory)
OBJ 7: Properties are not the kind of entities that are capable of
independent existence, they are not suitable to be ultimate
constituents of reality (Armstrong 1997). [REPLY: this is no more
than an undefended incredulous stare (Hawthorne and Cover (1998)]
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I do not claim that these tables are complete and exhaust all the (variants of)
objections there are against the three theories. But I do claim that all main
objections are there, and that these tables are complete enough to allow me to
suggest that none of the objections listed above is decisive, in the sense that none of
the three theories can be said to be clearly eliminated by it, and neither is one of the
three theories clearly eliminated by the collective force of the objections to it. But
the main point that I want to emphasize here is that, as for all of the six theories we
have seen above, the primitives of each theory do a big part of the job, when it
comes to answering the initial question(s) and replying to objections. It is only if we
grant the views their primitives (and ontological commitments) that they can face all
the objections. I am not saying, of course, that the three theories have all their
objections easily answered and that they are problem-free, all I am saying is that all
three views can plausibly face the objections that arise against them, with the crucial
help of their primitives.
Theory 3 Resemblance Nominalism, without paradigms
Answer to Question 1 Objects are not analyzed by this theory, they are taken as primitive
Answer to Questions 2 and 3 a is F iff a resembles all the Fs (the right-hand side being the more
fundamental)
a and b are both F (‘share the same property’) iff they are both
members of the same resemblance class
Primitives, and other
ontological commitments
Objects (answer to Question 1)
The fact that a and b resemble each other (but there is not a relation of
resemblance between a and b; resemblance is a relational fact without
there being such a relation)
Possibilia ? counterpart theory
Main objections (and replies) OBJ1: the possibility that there is only one object that is F (Armstrong
1978), [REPLY: use possibilia (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002)]
OBJ2: co-extensive properties, and the companionship difficulty
(Armstrong 1978; Campbell 1981; Jackson 1997; Manley 2002),
[REPLY: use possibilia (Lewis 1986; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002)]
OBJ3: the problem of naturalness (the imperfect community difficulty)
(Armstrong 1978; Manley 2002), (REPLY: (Rodriguez-Pereyra
2002) using primitive resemblance)
OBJ5: Russell’s regress (Russell 1912; Armstrong 1978), (REPLY:
there is no regress (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002 using the primitive fact
that a and b resemble each other)
OBJ6: resemblance nominalism and causality; causal powers of
objects should depend on how objects are and not on how they are
related to other objects (Armstrong 1978), (REPLY: causal powers do
depend on how objects are, while objects are the way they are in
virtue of resembling other objects—this is among the primitives of
resemblance nominalism (G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, private
communication)
OBJ7: a resembles b because a is F and b is F, not the other way
around (Armstrong 1978), (REPLY: this shows that on this point
resemblance nominalism goes against intuition, but the view has
theoretical virtues that outweigh this (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002)
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When one considers these primitives, one encounters problem-solvers exactly as
in the case of the six relational and substantival ontologies we have seen above.
Furthermore, some of these problem-solvers seem to play the same crucial role in
the same crucial place: one can ask ‘‘In virtue of what are two exactly resembling
tropes exactly similar?’’; another can ask ‘‘In virtue of what are these two instances
of F-ness instances of F-ness?’’; another can ask ‘‘In virtue of what do these two
particulars resemble each other?’’. Of course, these are unfair questions since they
ask the opponent to go beyond her primitives. But they illustrate the point I want to
emphasize—all three views answer the question of attribute agreement by using
their primitive machinery: the relation of exact resemblance between tropes, the
instantiation of the same universal, or the fact that a and b resemble each other. At
the same crucial places, all three views introduce a primitive with the same
function: primitively answer the question (‘‘In virtue of what x and y are both F?’’).
If one agrees to be fair to one’s opponents, granting them the same right to introduce
a primitive as one grants herself, it seems to me hard to claim that any of the
primitive ways of answering the question is better than the others. So, am I saying
that these three theories are equivalent, since they ‘‘do the same job’’ (that is,
account for attribute agreement) by appealing to primitive problem-solvers? No, for
two inter-related reasons. The three theories are structurally quite different so even
if it were true that they all employ problem-solvers to answer one of their central
challenges, they still do not use their problem-solvers in the same way (i.e. at the
same place in the theory). For instance, Theory 3 contains only objects and the
problem-solver (primitive resemblance), while Theory 1 contains bare objects and
universals and the problem-solver (primitive instantiation), so the two views are
structurally distinct. Thus, such views are not equivalent since while they do the
same job at a very general level (that is, they all account for attribute agreement)
they do not do their job in the same way, even if we were ready to accept that their
problem-solvers are equivalent. In order to claim that two theories are equivalent,
not only must they do the same overall job, but they must also do it in the same way
which in turn means that they must have a structure similar enough to allow for this
(in addition to the fact that they employ the same problem-solvers). Whether an
equivalence claim is too cheap or not depends then on the level of detail the claim
provides. If such a claim is very general, it is very cheap; but if it is elaborated in
detail and shows how the inner workings of two theories are similar, then it is worth
your money (Theory 2).
What this shows, en passant, is that in order to get any meta-metaphysical results,
such as equivalence claims between two theories, we need first to do first-level
metaphysics and study how things work at a great level of detail, to get any
worthwhile results. Thus, any meta-metaphysical claims should not be made in a too
general way but should always be supported by low-level considerations.13
13 For very helpful comments and discussions, I would like to thank Fabrice Correia, Akiko Frischhut,
Lynda Gaudemard, Richard Glauser, Ghislain Guigon, Mark Heller, Max Kistler, Jessica Leech, Dan
Lo´pez de Sa, Jonathan Lowe, Anne Meylan, Kevin Mulligan, Laurie Paul, Jonathan Schaffer, Gianfranco
Soldati, and John Zeimbekis. Special thanks go to two anonymous referees of Erkenntnis whose valuable
comments helped me to improve the final version of this paper.
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